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A ‘PLAUSIBLE’ OUTCOME?: TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND THE 
UNFORESEEN IMPACT ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
JENNIFER M. AUGER∗ 
Between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013, there were 284,604 civil 
cases filed, 300,485 pending, and 255,260 terminated among the federal 
district courts.1  Out of the civil cases terminated, 171,973 were terminated 
before pretrial and 25,816 were terminated during or after pretrial.2  Only 
1.2% of the terminated cases actually went to trial and of that fraction, 31% 
of those cases were still decided by nonjury means.3  This data illustrates an 
overall trend in the decline of trial rates for civil cases and a prevalence for 
adjudication during the early stages of litigation.4 
The rise in pretrial adjudication results in an emphasis on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) to administer these cases during 
the early stages of litigation.5  The Supreme Court of the United States 
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 1.  Table 4.1-U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending, Judicial 
Facts and Figures 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/41/judicial-
facts-and-figures/2013/09/30 (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).  
 2.  Table 4.10-U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by Action Taken, Judicial Facts 
and Figures 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/410/judicial-facts-
and-figures/2013/09/30 (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).  Additionally, 54,153 cases resulted in no 
court action.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  Of the 3,129 cases that went to trial, 977 were decided by nonjury means.  
 4.  In 1995, 3.2% of civil cases reached trial; in 2000, 2.2% reached trial; in 2005, 1.4% 
reached trial, and in 2011, 1.1% reached trial.  Id.  
 5.  See Emery G. Lee, III, Early Stages of Litigation Attorney Survey: Report to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1–2 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/leeearly.pdf/$file/leeearly.pdf (examining the use of 
certain Federal Rules during the pretrial stage in terminated cases, specifically FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(f) and 16(b)); see also Joe S. Cecil, et. al, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A 
Preliminary Analysis, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1, 3–4 (Nov. 2001), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/summjudg.pdf/$file/summjudg.pdf (noting the decrease 
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ultimately prescribes the Federal Rules,6 however, the Court often interprets 
the Rules within the confines of a particular case.7  As such, the impact of 
this judicial interpretation within the greater scheme of the litigation 
process may not be fully addressed or envisioned at the time.8  The effect of 
a specific judicial interpretation can have drastic effects on the use of 
certain Federal Rules as tools of litigation.9 
In a pair of decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly10 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,11 the Supreme Court purposively amended the standard for complaint 
pleading under Federal Rule 8(a), ushering in a new “heightened” 
plausibility standard and removing the requirement that courts accept the 
truth of conclusory statements.12  While Twombly and Iqbal specifically 
addressed the pleading standard for complaints, the impact of these 
decisions extends beyond complaints.13  Federal district courts are split as 
to whether this “heightened” plausibility standard should also apply to 
responsive pleadings, specifically with affirmative defenses.14  While a 
majority of the federal district courts extend the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses,15 a number of federal district courts also expressly 
reject the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.16  
As the Supreme Court did not address the universality of the Twombly and 
                                                          
in trials for civil cases over the past three decades and one possible cause being the increase in 
dispositive motions, specifically motions for summary judgments). 
 6.  “The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77, authorizes the Supreme Court to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for the federal courts.”  
Laws and Procedures Governing the Rulemaking Process, USCOURTS.Gov, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-procedures-
governing-work-rules-committees-0 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).  
 7.  See generally Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1552–56 (2013) (discussing the interplay between the Supreme Court and 
Advisory Committees, especially the difficulty caused by Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
Federal Rules).  
 8.  Richard Vetter, et. al., The Law of Unintended Consequences Revisited: The Case of 
Ricci v. DeStefano, CENTER FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (March 2009), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED536275.pdf (“Legislative actions as well as executive and 
judicial decisions of governments often have unintended consequences—results not foreseen or 
wanted at the time of the initial policy action.  On occasion, these unforeseen results clash with the 
intent of policies as originally formulated.”).  
 9.  See generally Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 239–40 (2011) (discussing the effect of the 
Supreme Court trilogy of decisions on the practice and use of summary judgment: Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). 
 10.  550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 11.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 12.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see infra Part I.B.  
 13.  See infra Part I.C. 
 14.  See infra Part I.C. 
 15.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 16.  See infra Part I.C.2.   
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Iqbal decisions, it remains uncertain if the “heightened” plausibility 
standard also governs the requirements for affirmative defense pleadings.17 
The “heightened” plausibility standard adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Twombly and Iqbal had the unintended consequence of “destabilizing” 
pleading practices, specifically the pleading standard for affirmative 
defenses.18  This Comment will explore the application of the “heightened” 
plausibility standard in relation to the underlying motivations that prompted 
the standard, in order to demonstrate that federal district courts should not 
extend this standard to affirmative defenses.19  Specifically, this Comment 
will examine the United States District Court for the District of Maryland as 
a microcosm to analyze the two views that currently split federal courts.20 
As the Supreme Court only addressed the pleading standard for 
complaints in Twombly and Iqbal, district courts should refrain from 
applying the heightened plausibility standard to affirmative defenses in 
order to maintain a consistent standard while preserving fairness and 
efficiency in the litigation process.21  District courts inconsistently apply the 
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses; creating an 
unstable standard, dependent on the preference within a specific jurisdiction 
or even the preference of a specific judge.22 
In addition, affirmative defenses do not raise the same fairness 
concerns underlying the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “heightened” 
plausibility standard, as the defendant is inherently limited by such a 
stringent pleading requirement in advance of discovery.23  Moreover, the 
“heightened” plausibility standard produces ill-fitting results when applied 
to affirmative defenses; namely cost and delay resulting from the likely 
increased use of motions to strike.24  The more appropriate avenue for 
determining the answer to this question is to follow the Rules Enabling Act 
and leave this decision to the Supreme Court.25 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The history of pleading standards in American jurisprudence reveals a 
shift in the understanding of the fundamental role of the judicial officer and 
                                                          
 17.  See infra Part I.C. 
 18.  See generally, Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (Oct. 2010) (arguing that Twombly and 
Iqbal destabilized both pleading and motion to dismiss practices). 
 19.  See infra Part II.A. 
 20.  See infra Part I.C. 
 21.  See infra Part II.A. 
 22.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 23.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 24.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 25.  See infra Part II.B. 
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court within the litigation process.26  The Federal Rules were adopted in the 
spirit of making courts more accessible for the average citizen and pursuing 
a decision on the merits of a case.27  The subsequent decision in Conley v. 
Gibson28 reiterated this reasoning by instituting a liberal notice pleading 
standard.29  In contrast, the adoption of the “heightened” plausibility 
standard by the Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal31 focused mainly on administrative concerns, specifically promoting 
efficient case management within the judiciary.32  The resulting split among 
the federal courts regarding the pleading standard for affirmative defenses 
illustrates these competing stances.33 
A.  Notice Pleading: Opening the Door to Plaintiffs and Looking to the 
Merits 
The common law precursor and succeeding “code” pleading regime 
instituted a rigid, technocratic formula for pleading complaints.34  The 
standard was obscure in practice and theory, drawing ambiguous 
distinctions between “ultimate facts” and “conclusions of law.”35  The shift 
to notice pleading sought to remove this distinction and introduce a more 
flexible standard.36  This Section will discuss the change to notice pleading 
introduced by the Federal Rules and the ensuing decisions by the Supreme 
Court affirming this standard. 
1.  Enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Introduced in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the 
strict code pleading system with a more reasonable notice pleading 
system.37  The drafters intentionally removed any reference to “facts,” 
“conclusions,” or “evidence” in order to distance notice pleading from the 
                                                          
 26.  See infra Part I.A and I.B. 
 27.  See infra Part I.A.  
 28.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 29.  Id. at 48; see infra Part I.A. 
 30.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31.  556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
 32.  See infra Part I.B. 
 33.  See infra Part I.C. 
 34.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
the English used the hyper-technical Hilary rules of 1834 and the United States relied on the New 
York Code of 1848, developed by David Dudley Field).  
 35.  Id. at 574 (“[T]he Field Code and its progeny required a plaintiff to plead ‘facts’ rather 
than ‘conclusions,’ a distinction that proved far easier to say than to apply.” (citing Weinstein & 
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 
520–21 (1957)).  
 36.  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (discussing the intent of the Federal 
Rules to adopt a “simplified” standard aimed to get to the merits of the claim). 
 37.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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prior rigid code pleading regime.38  Under the Federal Rules, the “idea was 
not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.”39  The Federal 
Rules focused on pleadings to serve “the task of general notice-giving,” 
after which “the merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible 
pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.”40  
Reflecting this sentiment, under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff need only plead a 
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”41  Likewise the standard for responsive pleadings emphasized this 
short and plain statement requirement; when pleading an answer, the 
defendant must “state in short and plain terms its defenses” and “admit or 
deny any allegations asserted against it.”42  Finally with affirmative 
defenses, Rule 8(c) also simply requires a party to affirmatively state any 
defense.43 
2.  Affirmation of Notice Pleading with Conley’s “No Set of Facts” 
Requirement 
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules, courts regularly upheld 
notice pleading, emphasizing the objective to prevent cursory dismissals of 
complaints and reach an outcome on the merits.44  The most notable 
Supreme Court decision, Conley v. Gibson, established the complaint 
pleading standard which governed for the next fifty years.45 
The Conley Court endorsed the language of Rule 8(a), reiterating that 
the plaintiff is only required to plead a “short and plain statement of the 
claim.”46  As such, the pleading standard for complaints did not “require a 
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”47  The 
Court noted this standard served the purpose of providing fair notice to the 
                                                          
 38.  Id. at 575. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.   
 41.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  
 42.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).  
 43.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) provides:  
In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or 
affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfaction; arbitration and award; 
assumption of risk; contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of consideration; 
fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; 
statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver.”  
Id. 
 44.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in one of the first cases to uphold notice 
pleading, noted the prior standard resulted in “judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.” 
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).  
 45.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (unanimous decision).  
 46.  Id. at 47 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  
 47.  Id. “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”  Id. at 48. 
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defendant “of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” 
without imposing an undue burden on the plaintiff at the initial pleading 
stage.48  Furthermore, the Court stated that a complaint should survive the 
initial pleading stage and proceed to discovery to “disclose more precisely 
the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the 
disputed facts and issues.”49 
The Conley Court then articulated the pleading standard for 
complaints:  “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”50  The 
Supreme Court routinely reaffirmed the Conley standard and twenty-seven 
jurisdictions subsequently adopted it as their standard for dismissal of 
complaints.51  As recently as 2002, the Supreme Court again endorsed the 
standard in SEC v. Zandford,52 noting that the court must “assume the 
allegations contained therein are true and [dismiss a complaint] only if no 
set of facts would entitle petitioner to relief.”53 
B.  Twombly and Iqbal: Plausibility as the Gatekeeper to the Federal 
Courts 
Beginning with Twombly and culminating in Iqbal, the Supreme Court 
departed from the standard espoused in Conley and introduced plausibility 
as the standard for pleading complaints. Twombly and Iqbal not only 
represent a change in the complaint pleading standard, but also a shift in the 
understanding of the role of pleading and access to courts.54  The 
underlying concern of the Court in both Twombly and Iqbal centered on 
administrative functions, namely upholding an efficient and meritorious 
admission process to the federal courts.55 
                                                          
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 45–46.  
 51.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 n.4 (2007) (Stevens. J., 
dissenting) (listing sixteen Supreme Court decisions citing to Conley as authority); see also id. at 
578 n.5 (identifying twenty-six States and the District of Columbia adopting the Conley standard 
as their standard for dismissal of complaints). 
 52.  535 U.S. 813 (2002).  
 53.  Id. at 818 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  The Supreme Court overturned the prior decision by 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit because the court applied the wrong standard when 
determining whether to dismiss a complaint.  Id.  
 54.  See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
 55.  See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
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1.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A Move to Plausibility 
The Twombly Court repudiated notice pleading, stating that conclusory 
statements and the “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action” were insufficient.56 
a. Application of the Conley Standard 
The plaintiffs in Twombly alleged a violation of Section One of the 
Sherman Act57 against certain Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 
(“ILECs”).58  The complaint alleged that the companies “conspired to 
restrain trade” with local telephone and high-speed internet services by 
“engag[ing] in parallel conduct” and entering into agreements to “refrain 
from competing against one another.”59  The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York initially dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.60  The district 
court concluded that to meet a conspiracy claim under the Sherman Act, the 
plaintiffs “must allege additional facts that ‘ten[d] to exclude independent 
self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel 
behavior.’”61  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding 
the district court should have examined the complaint under Conley and 
dismissed the complaint only if “there is no set of facts that would permit a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the 
product of collusion rather than coincidence.”62 
b.  Development of the Plausibility Standard 
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs did not provide any 
factual allegations demonstrating evidence of anything more than 
independent, parallel conduct and as such, the complaint did not sufficiently 
                                                          
 56.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  
 57.  Id. at 550 (“[W]hich prohibits [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1)). 
 58.  Id. at 549–50. 
 59.  Id. at 551.  The complaint stated that the ILECS “allegedly control ninety percent or more 
of the market for local telephone service in the forty-eight contiguous States,” id. at 550 n.1,  and 
alleged that the ILECs “engaged in parallel conduct . . . to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs 
[Competitive Local Exchange Carriers]” by making unfair agreements with the CLECs that 
provided “inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to 
sabotage the CLEC’s relations with their own customers.”  Id. at 550.  
 60.  Id. at 552.  The District Court stated that “plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by citing 
instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an agreement” but “this circumstantial 
evidence . . . [of] ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act 
entirely.”  Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 61.  Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179. 
 62.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 
425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
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allege conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act and was dismissed.63  
Discussing the standard that should apply to complaints, the Twombly Court 
expressed that “bare assertions” or “mere[] legal conclusions” could not 
suffice for factual allegations because something more was needed to 
demonstrate not just that the plaintiffs’ allegations were probable, but 
plausible.64  As such, the Court developed the plausibility standard, which 
requires a plaintiff to plead enough facts to “state a claim for relief that is 
plausible on its face.”65  The Court further argued that the plausibility 
standard better reflects the showing requirement for complaints articulated 
in Rule 8(a)(2) which requires that “the ‘plain statement’ possess enough 
heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”66 
The Twombly Court emphasized several administrative purposes 
prompting the adoption of the plausibility standard, namely discouraging 
frivolous lawsuits, preventing discovery abuse, and effectively managing 
caseloads.67  The Court reasoned that this “heightened” plausibility standard 
better prevented frivolous lawsuits by exposing the deficiency of a 
complaint at the “point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the 
parties and by the court.”68  In addition, the Court worried that these 
baseless claims proceeding past the complaint stage would constitute a 
threat of litigation prompting defendants to reach settlements in order to 
avoid the cost of litigation.69  This potential for discovery abuse required 
the Court to “insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a 
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.”70 The Twombly Court 
also questioned the capability of a judge to truly weed out frivolous cases 
via case management.71  Since the parties develop the legal claims and 
                                                          
 63.  Id. at 566.  The conduct of the ILECs could be “consistent with conspiracy, but just as 
much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy.”  Id. at 554. 
 64.  Id. at 555—57. 
 65.  Id. at 570.  The Court further clarified that it did not require “heightened fact pleading of 
specifics,” but just enough facts to demonstrate that a complaint is plausible on its face.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 558 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1216 at 233–34 (3d. ed. 2004)).  This deficiency includes not only 
complaints which do not allege enough factual matter to determine if entitlement to relief is 
plausible, but also complaints whose factual allegations, although true, could not “raise a claim to 
entitlement of relief.”  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 557–58.  Particularly in the context of antitrust cases, like that in Twombly, the 
Court worried that these baseless claims would be allowed “to take up the time of a number of 
other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement 
value.”  Id. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).  
 70.  Id. at 558 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of  
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)).  An additional concern regarding discovery abuse ties 
into the issue of case management, that the “success of judicial supervision in checking discovery 
abuse has been on the modest side.”  Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)).  
 71.  Id. at 559.  
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conduct discovery themselves, the judge is often not aware of all of the 
details of the case that will be presented.72  This leaves the judge unable to 
“prevent what [he] cannot detect,” and thus unable to prevent abusive 
discovery because he lacks the “essential information” of the case.73 
The Court finally retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language, stating 
that the phrase is “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard.”74  The Twombly Court further suggested that 
the “literal terms” of Conley were never accepted nor intended as a 
complaint pleading standard.75  The Court concluded that Conley described 
the “breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, 
not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s 
survival.”76 
c.  Concern Regarding the Adoption of the Plausibility Standard 
Justice Stevens authored a strong dissent, in which he expressed 
concern with the departure from existing precedent and possible 
consequences emanating from the shift to the plausibility standard.77  He 
addressed the break from precedent, noting the majority’s sudden retirement 
of Conley as the “dramatic departure from settled procedural law.”78  
Justice Stevens also called into question the majority’s account of Conley as 
“puzz[ling] the profession for [fifty] years.”79  He noted that Conley is cited 
as authority in a dozen Supreme Court decisions80 and deemed this “opinion 
[as] the first by any Member of this Court to express any doubt as to the 
adequacy of the Conley formulation.”81 
Next, Justice Stevens argued that Conley must be read in light of the 
Federal Rules and the subsequent evolution from code pleading to notice 
                                                          
 72.  Id. “The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves 
may not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find.”  Id. at 560 n.6 (quoting 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)).  
 73.  Id. at 560.  
 74.  Id. at 563. 
 75.  See id. at 562 (noting many judges and commentators “balked” at the literal interpretation 
of Conley as a pleading standard).  
 76.  Id. at 563.  The Court also argued that this reading of Conley is more in line with prior 
Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at n.8. 
 77.  Id. at 570–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 78.  Id. at 573.  Justice Stevens also noted that “[p]etitioners have not requested that the 
Conley formulation be retired, nor have any of the six amici who filed briefs in support of the 
petitioners.”  Id. at 579. 
 79.  Id. at 577 (quoting id. at 563 (majority opinion)).  
 80.  Id. at 577 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing sixteen Supreme Court opinions and four 
separate writings that cited to Conley as authority).  
 81.  Id. at 578.  
 914 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:905 
pleading.82  “Conley’s language, in short, captures the policy choice 
embodied in the Federal Rules and binding on the federal courts.”83   Justice 
Stevens suggests that the Conley standard already accomplishes precisely 
what the Court attempts to do with plausibility; it describes “the minimum 
standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”84 
Resolute in defending the Conley standard, Justice Stevens declared 
“[i]f Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not be 
without a eulogy.”85  He emphasized that a large number of jurisdictions, 
twenty-six states, and the District of Columbia adopted the language of 
Conley as their standard for dismissal of a complaint.86  Inherent in Justice 
Stevens’s dissent is the concern regarding the implications of this sudden 
shift in pleading standards.  In light of the extensive and long-standing 
precedent with Conley, Justice Stevens lamented that “[he] would not 
rewrite the Nation’s civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the 
pleading rules of most of its States without far more informed deliberation 
as to the costs of doing so.”87 
The Twombly decision marked the beginning of a departure from the 
established notice pleading regime and Conley standard.  The Twombly 
Court focused on ensuring that only meritorious claims would make it to 
the courtroom through effective case management, and thus adopted a new 
standard of plausibility for complaints.88  As a result, plaintiffs must now 
plead enough factual allegations within the complaint to “state a claim for 
relief that is plausible on its face.”89 
2.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Clarification and Expansion of Plausibility 
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed the plausibility 
standard for pleading complaints established in Twombly and further 
clarified the standard by articulating a two-prong method of analysis.90 
a.  A Request for Clarification 
The plaintiff in Iqbal faced charges of fraud in relation to his 
identification documents and was under investigation as a person of “high 
                                                          
 82.  Id. at 573–83.  “[A]s the Conley Court well knew, the pleading standard the Federal 
Rules meant to codify does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts.”  Id. at 580.  
 83.  Id. at 583. 
 84.  Id. at 580 (quoting id. at 563 (majority opinion)).   
 85.  Id. at 577.  
 86.  Id. at 578 n.5 (listing the twenty-six state opinions that adopted the Conley standard for 
dismissal of a complaint). 
 87.  Id. at 579.  Justice Stevens further notes that there is an existing process to make these 
sorts of revisions through Congress and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74.  Id. 
 88.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 90.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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interest” in relation to the September 11, 2001 attacks.91  The plaintiff 
claimed that while he was being investigated he was subject to harsh 
conditions of confinement, based solely on account of his “religion, race, or 
national origin.”92  The plaintiff brought claims against a number of 
government officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional protections 
while in federal custody.93 
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state sufficient allegations demonstrating their personal involvement in the 
treatment of the plaintiff in order to defeat a defense of qualified 
immunity.94  The district court denied the motion, and, relying on Conley, 
found the plaintiffs “alleged sufficient facts to warrant discovery as to the 
defendants involvement.”95  The defendants then filed an interlocutory 
appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.96  The 
Supreme Court decided Twombly while this appeal was pending, thus the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first considered how to apply the 
Twombly plausibility standard.97  The court of appeals concluded that 
Twombly set out a “flexible plausibility standard” and only required a 
pleader to “amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts 
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”98 
The court of appeals found that the “context” of the appeal in this case 
did not require amplification and thus held that the plaintiff’s complaint 
adequately alleged the defendants personal involvement.99  However, the 
court of appeals urged the Supreme Court to “address the appropriate 
pleading standard ‘at the earliest opportunity.’”100  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 91.  Id. at 667. 
 92.  Id at 668–69.  The plaintiff’s claims included being physically accosted by federal 
corrections officers who prevented him from practicing his religion, by refusing to let him pray.  
Id. at 668.  
 93.  Id. at 668.  The plaintiff “filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York against thirty-four current and former federal officials and nineteen 
‘John Doe’ federal corrections officers.”  Id.  The plaintiff further named the former Attorney 
General of the United States, John Ashcroft, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, Robert Mueller, in the complaint and alleged they “knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” plaintiff to the harsh conditions during his detention. 
Id. 
 94.  Id. at 669 (quoting Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 LEXIS 21434, *51–
52 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2005)).  
 95.  Elmaghraby, 2005 LEXIS 21434, at *68.  The Court also noted the “[p]laintiffs should 
not be penalized for failing to assert more facts where, as here, the extent of defendants’ 
involvement is peculiarly within their knowledge.”  Id. 
 96.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669. 
 97.  Id. at 669–70. 
 98.  Id. at 670 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 99.  Id. (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 174). 
 100.  Id. (citing Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring)).  
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granted certiorari to clarify the plausibility standard articulated in 
Twombly.101 
b.  Further Articulation of the Plausibility Standard 
The Court first clarified the Twombly standard by providing a clearer 
understanding of the meaning of “plausibility.”  For a claim to have facial 
plausibility, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”102  A complaint must plead facts that are more than “‘merely 
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” in order to cross the line from 
probability to plausibility that the “defendant has acted unlawfully.”103   
Finally, the Court further confirmed that the decision in Twombly 
“expounded the [complaint] pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”104  
With that, the Iqbal Court put the final nail in the coffin for Conley’s “no 
set of facts” standard. 
Next, the Court provided a two-prong approach to determine the 
sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard.105  First, a court 
must distinguish between well-pleaded factual allegations and legal 
conclusions.106  As only factual allegations are entitled to the “presumption 
of truth,” “legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, 
[but] they must be supported by factual allegations.”107  Second, a court 
must determine whether the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement of relief.”108  The Court clarified that this is a “context-specific 
task,” which requires “the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense” to determine if the complaint rises to this level.109 
Akin to the reasoning articulated by the Twombly Court, the Court in 
Iqbal relied on the Federal Rules and case management concerns to support 
                                                          
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  In this 
case, the Court found that the complaint did not “contain any factual allegation sufficient to 
plausibly suggest [defendants’] discriminatory state of mind.”  Id. at 684. 
 103.  Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).  Rather, the Court determined the complaint’s 
“only factual allegation against [defendants Ashcroft and Mueller] accuses them of adopting a 
policy approving ‘restrictive conditions of confinement’ for post-September-11 detainees until 
they were cleared by the FBI.”  Id. at 683.  The complaint did not provide factual content to 
“nudge his claim of purposeful discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”  Id. 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  
 104.  Id. at 684.  The Court made clear that the plausibility standard was not limited solely to 
claims of antitrust or discrimination suits like those seen in Twombly and Iqbal.  Id. 
 105.  The Court provided this analysis in the context of what is necessary for a complaint to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 678–79. 
 106.  Id. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d. 143, 157–78 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 107.  Id. at 679.  The Court further stated that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 108.  Id. at 679. 
 109.  Id. at 678–79. 
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the plausibility standard.110  The Court confirmed that the Twombly decision 
was “based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8,” which requires 
a showing that the pleader was entitled to relief.111  Again, the Court 
rejected the “careful-case-management approach,” arguing that a “motion to 
dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls 
placed upon the discovery process.”112  Further supporting concerns of 
effective case management, the Court again noted the limited role and 
success of judicial supervision in averting discovery abuse.113 
c.  Apprehension Regarding the Practical Application of the 
Plausibility Standard 
Justice Souter authored a dissent in which he argued the majority 
misapplied the Twombly pleading standard.114  Justice Souter contended 
that Twombly does not require a court to consider whether the allegations in 
the complaint are probably true, but rather “that a court must take the 
allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.”115  He 
articulated that “[t]he sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are 
sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green 
men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”116 
Justice Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s dissent, but wrote separately 
to voice his concern over the emphasis the majority placed on preventing 
“unwarranted litigation” from interfering with the work of the 
Government.117  He noted that trial courts have “other legal weapons 
designed to prevent unwarranted interference.”118  Justice Breyer concluded 
that he is not convinced by the majority opinion that these “alternative case-
                                                          
 110.  Id. at 684–87.  
 111.  Id. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, 
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff 
armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). 
 112.  Id. at 684–85.  The plaintiff argued that the court of appeals instructed the district court to 
conduct minimally invasive discovery in order to “preserve the [defendant’s] defense of qualified 
immunity” while determining the defendant’s personal involvement in the treatment of the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 684.  
 113.  Id. at 685 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)).  
 114.  Id. at 687–99 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 115.  Id. at 696. Justice Souter ultimately determined “there is no principled basis for the 
majority’s disregard of the allegations linking [defendants] Ashcroft and Mueller to their 
subordinates’ discrimination.”  Id. at 698. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer found the majority incorrectly 
interpreted Twombly and Federal Rule 8 to prevent unwarranted litigation in the context of this 
case, with government officials.  Id. at 699–700.   
 118.  Id. at 700.  Specifically, the trial court can “structure discovery in ways that diminish the 
risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials.”  Id.  
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management tools [are] inadequate, either in general or in the case before 
us.”119 
C.  The Unknown Extent of the Plausibility Standard in the Universe of 
Pleadings 
In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts regularly apply the 
plausibility standard to complaints.120  Courts have not, however, 
consistently applied the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.121  
Neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals has yet to address this 
issue.122  Presently, there is no consensus on the issue among the lower 
courts; a split exists within some circuits123 and even within individual 
district courts.124  The United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland (“U.S. District Court for Maryland”) demonstrates this split, with 
the inconsistent application of the “heightened” plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses.125  Part I.C.1 discusses what is considered the 
“majority approach” within the U.S. District Court for Maryland, which 
applies the standard to affirmative defenses.126  Part I.C.2 discusses the 
“minority approach,” which declines to extend the standard to affirmative 
defenses.127 
1.  The Majority Stance: The Plausibility Standard Applies to 
Affirmative Defenses 
The majority approach within the U.S. District Court for Maryland 
applies the reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal to require the heightened 
standard for affirmative defense pleadings.128  First, the majority argues that 
                                                          
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D. Md. 2010); LBCMT 
2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014); Hansen v. Rhode 
Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 121 (D. Mass. 2012); HCRI 
TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (N.D. Ohio 2010).  
 121.  See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. 
 122.  Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122; EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 
2012); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387. 
 123.  Compare Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 (E.D.N.C. 2010)  
(applying Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses), with Lockheed Martin Corp. v United 
States, 973 F. Supp. 2d, 591, 595 (D. Md. 2013) (declining to apply Twombly and Iqbal to 
affirmative defenses). 
 124.  Compare Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (finding Twombly and Iqbal apply to 
affirmative defenses), with Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (holding Twombly and 
Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defense pleadings); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC, 302 
F.R.D. at 387 (finding Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses).  
 125.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text.   
 126.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 127.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 128.  Hammer v. Peninsula Poultry Equip. Co., Civil Action No. 12-1139, 2013 WL 97398 (D. 
Md. Jan. 8, 2013); Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., 
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the plausibility standard better addresses administrative concerns, most 
notably efficient case management.129  Second, in the context of affirmative 
defenses, the plausibility standard better ensures fairness in the litigation 
process.130  Third, in light of Rule 8, the plausibility standard should extend 
to all pleadings in order to provide a consistent standard.131 
Courts adopting this approach argue that extending the “heightened” 
plausibility standard promotes litigation efficiency by discouraging the 
assertion of boilerplate affirmative defenses.132  Furthermore, that 
prevention of boilerplate affirmative defenses will minimize discovery 
abuse.133  In Aguilar v. City Lights of China Restaurant134 the defendant 
pleaded five affirmative defenses135 in response to the complaint, without 
any articulation of the factual basis for the defenses.136  The court struck 
four of the defenses, noting specifically that the majority of the defenses set 
“forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of any supporting factual 
content.”137  The court noted that the effect of these boilerplate defenses is 
to “clutter the docket and . . . create unnecessary work,” which then results 
in opposing counsel conducting “unnecessary discovery.”138  Requiring 
some statement of the ultimate facts underlying the defense promotes 
litigation efficiency, while preventing the “unnecessary discovery that 
troubled the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.”139 
Tied with this concern of boilerplate assertions is the interest of 
fairness to the plaintiff. Notably, one of the fundamental purposes of 
                                                          
Civil Action No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011); Ulyssix Techs. Inc. v 
Orbital Network Eng’g, Inc., Civil No. 10-02091, 2011 WL 631145 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2011); Barry 
v. EMC Mortgage, Civil No. 10-3120, 2011 WL 4352104 (D. Md. Sep. 15, 2011); Blind Indus. 
and Serv. of Md. v. Route 40 Paintball Park, Civil No. 11-3562, 2012 WL 2946688 (D. Md. July 
17, 2012); Alston v. Equifax Info. Serv., LLC, Civil No. 13-934, 2014 WL 580148 (D. Md. Feb. 
11, 2014); Topline Sol., Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., Civil No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836 (D. 
Md. July 27, 2010). 
 129.  See infra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 130.  See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.  
 131.  See infra text accompanying note 145. 
 132.  Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“The application of the Twombly and Iqbal standard 
to defenses will also promote litigation efficiency and will discourage defendants from asserting 
boilerplate affirmative defenses.”). 
 133.  Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 
2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008). 
 134.  Civil Action No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (Chasanow, J.). 
 135.  Including (1) accord and satisfaction; (2) estoppel, (3) laches, (4) payment/offset, and (5) 
fraud.  Id. at *1. 
 136.  Answer at 3, Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-02416 (D. Md. 
Sept. 22, 2011).  
 137.  Aguilar, 2011 WL 5118325 at *4.  The Court struck the fraud defense because it failed to 
satisfy the pleading standard set forth under Rule 9(b).  Id. at *4.  
 138.  Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536). 
 139.  Id. at *4. 
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pleading is to provide notice.140  As such, applying the plausibility standard 
to affirmative defenses provides the opposing party with notice of the 
factual basis for the assertion.141  Furthermore, disclosing the factual basis 
at this juncture provides “proper notice of defenses in advance of the 
discovery process and trial.”142  This approach suggests that the plausibility 
standard better promotes the interests of fairness and consistency by 
allowing the plaintiff to shape litigation strategy and discovery within the 
framework of this defense.143  Additionally, courts adopting this approach 
argue that the interest of fairness is not achieved when different standards 
result in different requirements for each party, specifically, where the 
plaintiff is required to operate under one standard, while the defendant is 
permitted to “operate under a different, less stringent standard.”144 
The majority further supports the extension of the plausibility standard 
to the entirety of Rule 8, noting that “although Twombly and Iqbal 
specifically addressed the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8(a), the 
[Supreme] Court likely did not intend to confine its holdings to complaints 
alone.”145  In Barry v. EMC Mortgage,146 the court noted that while the 
language of Rule 8(a) and 8(b) are not identical, there is “important textual 
overlap, with both subsections requiring a ‘short and plain statement’ of the 
claim or defense.”147  The Barry court found that five of the defendant’s 
affirmative defenses failed to meet these requirements because “[e]ach of 
those defenses set forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of any 
factual content to support them.”148  The court concluded the defenses did 
not “set forth in ‘short and plain’ terms the nature of the asserted defense 
and [thus] violate[d] Rule 8’s general pleading requirements.”149  Based on 
the similar language within the subsections of Rule 8 and interpretation of 
pleading practices under this Rule in Twombly and Iqbal, the majority 
contends the plausibility standard should extend to all of Rule 8, including 
affirmative defenses. 
                                                          
 140.  See supra Part I.A. 
 141.  Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536.  
 142.  Id.  The Court also noted that “the extension of these pleading requirements will not 
unduly hamstring a party’s ability to mount a thorough and vigorous defense.”  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Topline Sol., Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., Civil No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836, at *1 (D. 
Md. July 27, 2010). 
 145.  Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civil No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *4 
(D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011). 
 146.  Civil No. 10-3120, 2011 WL 4352104 (D. Md. Sep. 15, 2011) (Chasanow, J.).  
 147.  Barry, 2011 WL 4352104 at *3. 
 148.  Id. at *5.  The affirmative defenses included (1) good faith compliance, (2) estoppel, (3) 
release, (4) statute of frauds, and (5) waiver.  Id. at *4–5.  
 149.  Id. at *5.   
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2.  The Minority Stance: Declining to Extend the Plausibility 
Standard to Affirmative Defenses 
An outspoken minority within the U.S. District Court for Maryland 
have declined to extend the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.150  
Their approach notes a principal concern with overextending the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions and thus overstepping the Supreme Court.151  
Furthermore, the minority approach argues the concerns articulated in 
Twombly and Iqbal, regarding effective case management and fairness to 
the parties, do not apply in the realm of affirmative defenses.152  Finally, the 
minority relies on the plain language of Rule 8 to further demonstrate that 
complaints and affirmative defenses should not be held to the same 
standard.153 
The minority approach emphasizes the concern that Twombly and 
Iqbal only address the pleading standard for complaints under Rule 
8(a)(2).154  As such, extending the plausibility standard to the rest of the 
subsections of Rule 8 and all pleadings goes beyond the holdings of these 
decisions.155  In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States,156 the court argued 
it was “unlikely that the Supreme Court ‘would have ushered in such a 
radical change in legal landscape sub silentio.’”157  Thus, the lack of any 
discussion of affirmative defenses within Twombly or Iqbal led the 
Lockheed court to determine that the Supreme Court did not intend, nor 
consider, whether the “heightened” plausibility standard applied to 
affirmative defenses.158 
Additionally, the minority approach argues the policy concerns 
articulated in Twombly and Iqbal are not furthered by the application of the 
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.  The differences 
between the functions of an initiatory pleading, such as complaints, and a 
responsive pleading, such as affirmative defenses, implicate distinctive 
                                                          
 150.  It is interesting to note that while there are fewer decisions by the U.S. District Court for 
Maryland declining to apply Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses, these decisions are more 
recent and contain a greater number of published decisions.  Compare Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Md. 2013); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. 
Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385 (D. Md. 2014) (declining to extend Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative 
defenses), with cases cited supra note 128 (concluding Twombly and Iqbal do apply to pleading 
affirmative defenses). 
 151.  See infra text accompanying notes 154–155.  
 152.  See infra text accompanying note 159. 
 153.  See infra text accompanying notes 169–175.  
 154.  See text accompanying supra note 66. 
 155.  Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594.  
 156.  973 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2013) (Williams, Jr., J.). 
 157.  Id. at 594 (quoting Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cty, Md., Civil Action No. 8:11-cv-
02873, 2012 WL 3715331, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012)).  Sub silentio meaning “under silence; 
without expressly being mentioned.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1656 (10th ed. 2014).  
 158.  Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
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approaches when addressing these policy concerns.159  First, with 
affirmative defenses, the minority approach argues the concerns regarding 
effective case management and preventing frivolous litigation are better 
dealt with through discovery and existing procedural safeguards.160  The 
court addressed this incompatibility in Lockheed Martin Corp., suggesting 
that discovery is the more appropriate venue for case management concerns 
with affirmative defenses.161  The Lockheed Court noted that “while the 
presence of boilerplate affirmative defenses could make more material 
relevant to a party’s claim or defense, courts presumably could consider a 
defense’s conclusory nature when ruling on the discovery request.”162  The 
Court further concluded “judicial economy and equity depend on screening 
complaints more than they do on screening affirmative defenses.”163  
Moreover, this approach notes the existence of safeguards like Rule 11,164 
which discourages the pleading of boilerplate affirmative defenses since 
defendants “are still held to a basic standard of accountability for the 
contents of their court papers.”165 
Second, courts argue that the concerns regarding fairness for the 
plaintiff in the majority approach preclude any consideration of the interests 
of fairness to the defendant.  Federal Rule 12 provides a twenty-one day 
window of time in which the defendant must answer the complaint.166  This 
shorter window of time puts defendants at a disadvantage to “determine and 
plead affirmative defenses” in contrast to the longer amount of time that 
plaintiffs have “to develop the facts that should be pled to support their 
complaint.”167  The minority approach suggests that applying the 
plausibility standard and requiring a defendant to assert factual allegations 
                                                          
 159.  Id. at 595 (“[A]ffirmative defenses do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court and, at least 
technically, do not expose plaintiffs to liability.”). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 594–95. 
 162.  Id. at 595. 
 163.  Id. at 595 (citing Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2-07-CV-336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 (D. 
Utah Apr. 19, 2012)).  
 164.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 governs representations made to the court and requires that: “the 
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).  The rule also requires that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).   
 165.  LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 388 (D. Md. 2014).  
 166.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A). 
 167.  Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (quoting Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple 
Cell, Inc., No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933, at *9 n.6 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2012)). “Rule 8(a)’s more 
demanding principle is better applied to claimants who have had significant time to craft their 
claims.” LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387. 
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to support the stated defense “unfairly places on them too substantial a 
burden too early in the litigation process.”168 
Finally, courts argue the textual differences between the provisions of 
Rule 8 cannot support the application of one standard to all the 
provisions.169  The Court in LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike v. Sheppard170 
stated “it is reasonable to interpret the wording of Rule 8(b) and (c) . . . 
differently from the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the 
distinctive wording of Rule 8(a) applicable to claims for relief.”171  Rule 
8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement showing the plaintiff is entitled 
to relief.”172  While Rule 8(b) requires a party to “state in short and plain 
terms its defenses” and “admit or deny the allegations.”173  Similarly, under 
Rule 8(c)(1) when pleading an affirmative defense, a party is only required 
to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”174  The court 
in Lockheed Martin Corp. declared “[i]t would be anomalous if Rule 8(b) 
allowed parties to generally deny the allegations in the complaint yet [under 
Rule 8(c)(1)] required them to plead facially plausible affirmative 
defenses.”175  This approach relies on the differences in the language 
between pleading standards for complaints and defenses to illustrate the 
incompatibility between the “heightened” plausibility standard and 
affirmative defenses.176 
II.  ANALYSIS 
As economist Frédéric Bastiat once noted, there is a crucial distinction 
between effects that are “seen” and those that are “unseen:”  
Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself 
simultaneously with its cause—it is seen.  The others unfold in 
succession—they are not seen: it is well for us if they are 
foreseen . . . this constitutes the whole difference—the one takes 
account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the 
                                                          
 168.  LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387. 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  302 F.R.D. 385 (D. Md. 2014) (Bredar, J.).  
 171.  Id. at 387. 
 172.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).  As noted by the Court in Twombly, “showing” 
is the key term, indicating that the plaintiff must provide factual allegations demonstrating that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). 
 173.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1).  The Lockheed court also noted that although FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(b)(3) does not mention affirmative defenses, a party is allowed to generally deny all the 
allegations of a pleading.  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (D. 
Md. 2013). 
 174.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 175.  Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
 176.  Id.; LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387. 
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effects which are seen and also of those which it is necessary to 
foresee.177 
As Justice Stevens recognized, the adoption of the plausibility standard 
lacked examination of the unseen and thus “call[ed] into doubt the pleading 
rules . . . without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing 
so.”178  The cost in this case is the destabilization of pleading practices as 
demonstrated by the divide amongst the lower courts over the appropriate 
standard for affirmative defenses.179 
In application, extending the “heightened” plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses does not achieve the objectives articulated by the Court 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly180 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.181  This 
extension to affirmative defenses resulted in a number of unintended 
consequences within pleading practices in the federal courts.  First, there is 
a state of confusion regarding the governing standard causing uncertainty 
for defendants when pleading an affirmative defense.182  Second, it hinders 
fairness in the litigation process by blocking defendants’ access to 
discovery in order to completely develop the factual basis for these 
defenses.183  Third, the heightened plausibility standard arguably causes an 
increase in wasteful pleading practices by engendering the use of 
“retaliatory” motions to strike.184   
Furthermore, the decision to extend the “heightened” plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses violates the Rules Enabling Act.185  The 
federal district courts should refrain from extending the “heightened 
plausibility” standard without clarification from the Supreme Court.186  As 
the Supreme Court and Rules Committees can provide clear guidance for all 
federal courts, the decision is better left to that venue.187 
                                                          
 177.  M. FREDERIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Not Seen, reprinted in 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 49, 49 (New York, G.P. Putnam & Sons 3d ed., 1874).  
 178.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 579 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 179.  See supra Part I.C.  
 180.  550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 181.  556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
 182.  See infra Part II.A.1.  
 183.  See infra Part II.A.2.  
 184.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 185.  See infra Part II.B. 
 186.  See infra Part II.B. 
 187.  See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  The Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses: An 
Ill-Fitting Result 
1.  The Lack of a Consistent Standard Results in an Unclear 
Expectation for Defendants 
The standard for pleading affirmative defenses varies, both by 
jurisdiction and even by judicial preference, making it difficult for 
defendants to knowledgably plead affirmative defenses. Furthering this 
confusion and uncertainty is the noted fluctuation in which approach is 
predominantly endorsed by courts.188  In the immediate aftermath of 
Twombly and Iqbal, the majority of federal courts that addressed this issue 
decided in favor of the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses.189  However, a number of courts190 and scholars191 recently noted 
a shift in the trend of which approach is favored.  For instance, in the U.S. 
District Court for Maryland, early decisions adopted the majority approach 
and favored extending the standard to affirmative defenses, but a number of 
recent decisions adopted the minority approach and declined to apply the 
standard.192 
An additional factor muddying the waters for defendants is the impact 
of judicial preference in determining whether the standard applies.193  As 
most opinions on the issue acknowledge, neither the Supreme Court nor any 
Court of Appeals have addressed this issue, leaving judges without 
established precedent to follow.194  Thus, judges exercise their own 
                                                          
 188.  See infra notes 189–192 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d. 532, 536 (D. Md. 2010) 
(noting a “growing majority” of district courts apply Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses); 
see also Amy St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, The Forgotten Pleading, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 
152, 165 (2013) (stating that the “emerging majority view” favors application of the standard to 
affirmative defenses). 
 190.  See EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (noting the 
growing minority of district courts to hold that Twombly/Iqbal does not apply to affirmative 
defenses); see also Hansen v. Rhode Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 
119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing that a “majority of early cases applied the heightened standard, 
[but] this is now the minority approach”). 
 191.  See Peter M. Durney & Jonathan P. Michaud, Fending off the Use of a Rule 12(f) Motion 
to Strike Affirmative Defenses,  DEF. COUNS. J., 438, 444 n.47 (Oct. 2012) (noting that an 
“increasing” number of district courts are declining to apply the standard to affirmative defenses); 
see also Stephen Mayer, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
275, 275 (2013) (noting that initially a majority of district courts applied the plausibility standard, 
“but recently the courts that have declined to extend the plausibility standard have gained majority 
status”).  
 192.  See supra note 150. 
 193.  See Miller, supra note 18, at 101 n.391 (noting that “[t]he main factor in determining 
whether a particular district court judge applies the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses 
appears to be his or her interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal”).  
 194.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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predilection regarding which standard applies.195  This fluctuation and 
judicial predilection does not provide the defendant with a clear expectation 
when pleading an affirmative defense. 
2.  Promoting Fairness: Discovery Is the More Appropriate Venue 
to Shape the Bases of Affirmative Defenses 
The interest in fairness demonstrates another area where the concerns 
espoused in Twombly and Iqbal do not align when applying the 
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.  Critics of the 
minority approach argue that not extending the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses creates one pleading standard for plaintiffs and a less 
stringent pleading standard for defendants.  However, this criticism again 
ignores the differences between initiatory and responsive pleadings.  A 
primary purpose of pleading, specifically with complaints, is to provide 
“the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”196  The pleading system inherently places a higher pleading 
burden on the plaintiff because the complaint invokes the jurisdiction of the 
court, exposing the defendant to liability and both parties to the time and 
expense of litigation.197  In addition, existing procedures act as fail-safes 
and protect the plaintiff during the discovery process.198  Affirmative 
defenses are still subject to review during the discovery process and, as with 
any defense that is baseless or has no merit, “there will be nothing . . . to 
discover or to litigate.”199 
Furthermore, the application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative 
defenses “discounts the fact that defendants usually have considerably less 
time to develop affirmative defenses than plaintiffs do claims for relief.”200  
The Federal Judicial Center conducted a study analyzing the effect of 
Twombly and Iqbal on pleading practices.201  The results show that 
                                                          
 195.  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Md. 2013) 
(discussing how specific judges decided on the issue); see also LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 
LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014) (deciding to not apply the standard, in part, 
because of the reasoning of Judge Williams in Lockheed Martin).  
 196.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  
 197.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the functional difference between 
pleading complaints and defenses). 
 198.  The court stated that parties can seek protective orders in response to “onerous discovery 
requests.”  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (D. Md. 2013). 
Additionally, defendants are still held to the standard of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, under which reciting a 
“litany of irrelevant and unsupported affirmative defenses” constitutes sanctionable conduct. 
LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014). 
 199.  Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell, Inc., Civil No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933, at *9 (D. 
Md. July 17, 2013).  
 200.  Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
 201.  See Lee, III, supra note 5. 
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practitioners changed their pleading practices to conduct “[m]ore factual 
investigation prior to filing”, include “more factual details in [the] 
complaint,” and “[s]creen cases more carefully.”202  These changed 
practices imply more time necessary to complete these tasks before filing 
the complaint.  In contrast, under Federal Rule 12, the defendant is given 
twenty-one days to develop the factual bases for the affirmative defenses, 
formulate the response, and submit the answer.203 
When answering this critique of the shortened time frame for 
defendants to respond, courts that extend the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses rely on the availability of Rule 15.204  Under Rule 15, a 
defendant may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-
one days of serving it.205  After the twenty-one day window passes, a 
defendant must seek consent from the opposing party or leave from the 
court to further amend its pleading.206  These courts argue that under Rule 
15, “a defendant may seek leave to amend its answers to assert any viable 
defenses that may become apparent during the discovery process.”207  
Moreover, “trial courts liberally grant such leave” provided it does not 
result in “unfair prejudice to the opposing party.”208 
However, courts’ focus on Rule 15 ignores the interplay of Rule 26 
and the ability of the defendant to access worthwhile discovery materials to 
amend its defenses.209  Under Rule 26(f), the parties are required to meet as 
soon as possible to confer about discovery.210  The parties may not seek 
discovery until a Rule 26(f) conference takes place.211  Yet, the defendant is 
still subject to Rule 12, which requires a defendant to answer within twenty-
one days, and Rule 15(a)(1), which only grants leave to amend as a matter 
of course within twenty-one days after serving the answer.212  As such, 
within this short timeframe created by Rule 12 and 15(a)(1), the Rule 26(f) 
conference may not have occurred, or if it has, little discovery exists for the 
                                                          
 202.  Id. at 8, 16. 
 203.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).  
 204.  See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536–37 (D. Md. 2010) 
(stating the availability of Rule 15(a) allows a defendant to amend and add affirmative defenses as 
the factual bases becomes apparent during discovery).  
 205.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A).  
 206.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 
 207.  Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
 208.  Id. at 536–37 (citing Zenith Radio Corp., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 
(1971)).  
 209.  See Mayer, supra note 191, at 293–96 (discussing issues created by the application of the 
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses, regarding discovery and accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure).   
 210.  And at least twenty-one days before the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(f)(1). 
 211.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) provides limited exceptions to this 
provision.  
 212.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). 
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defendant to access and use in amending the answer.213  Thus for the 
defendant to genuinely amend the answer, by incorporating the necessary 
factual basis to meet the plausibility standard for affirmative defenses, it is 
more likely defendants will be forced to request leave from the court under 
Rule 15(a)(2).  In comparison to the time that plaintiffs may have to 
develop the factual basis for their complaints, without interference from the 
Court or in the face of opposition from the future defendant, the time frame 
allotted to the defendants is minimal.214  The reliance on Rule 15 to ensure 
fairness for the defendant rings hollow in its practical application. 
3.  Incorporation of Plausibility with Affirmative Defenses Will 
Result in Cost and Delay Due to a Likely Increase in Motions to 
Strike 
The application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses will 
likely lead to an increase in “retaliatory” motions to strike for failure to 
plead according to this standard.  It is unclear if these “retaliatory” motions 
to strike will be successful as courts seem to focus more on demonstrating 
prejudice to the plaintiff than to the affirmative defense pleading standard 
when assessing a motion to strike.215  The resulting increase in these 
motions illustrates how the efficiency concerns voiced in Twombly and 
Iqbal are not achieved by the application of the “heightened” plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses. 
a. The Likely Increase in Motions to Strike Will Lead to 
Inefficient Expenditure of Resources 
With the application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses, 
courts will likely experience a rise in the number of related dispositive 
motions, particularly motions to strike.216  A motion to strike, under Rule 
12(f), is a “procedural vehicle” for the plaintiff to attack affirmative 
defenses.217  In the wake of major Supreme Court decisions, which establish 
                                                          
 213.  It is only after this Rule 26(f) conference that parties must make disclosures within 
fourteen days at or after the conference.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
 214.  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (D. Md. 2013) (“For 
instance, in this case, Plaintiff requests a refund for taxes paid in 2004–2008.  Yet Plaintiff did not 
file suit until 2013.  Once Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant technically had sixty days to respond to 
the complaint.”).  
 215.  See infra Part II.A.3.b.  
 216.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) provides that: “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on 
its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a 
response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.” 
 217.  See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189 at 170–71 (discussing the basis for a plaintiff 
to utilize a motion to strike an affirmative defense, including “(1) misdesignations (e.g. pleading a 
negative defense as an affirmative defense); (2) defective pleading (e.g. failure to comply with 
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a new understanding of dispositive motion standards, courts often see an 
increase in the filing of these motions thereafter.218  This increase in 
motions practice creates “expensive and time-consuming procedural stop 
signs,” inevitably causing more cost and delay.219 
In the context of pleading practices, a major concern after Twombly 
and Iqbal was the impact on the use of motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.220  This concern prompted a study by the Federal Judicial 
Center to determine the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the use of Rule 
12(b)(6) motions.221  The study found that motions to dismiss were more 
common after Twombly and Iqbal.222  Additionally, the study estimated that 
the probability of a motion to dismiss being filed in an individual case 
increased, from 2.9% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2010.223  While we await studies 
regarding the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on Rule 12(f) motions to strike, 
the likely result is the “proliferation of litigation under Rule 12(f).”224  
The subsequent rise in motions to dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal 
also lead the judiciary to develop techniques to deal with this increased 
motions practice.  For example, the Honorable Mark A. Goldsmith in the 
Unites States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan noted that 
many motions to dismiss are “only fencing exercises” which result in the 
opposing party being granted leave to amend.225  The result of this exercise 
is that parties spend “precious time and money briefing the issues and the 
                                                          
Rules 8 and 9); and (3) legally insufficient pleading (e.g. pleading an affirmative defense that is 
not cognizable under the governing law)”). 
 218.  See Cecil, supra note 5 (finding an increase in motions for summary judgment in the 
wake of the Supreme Court trilogy of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).  
 219.  See Miller, supra note 18, at 2, 49–53 (discussing the effects of Twombly and Iqbal in 
relation to the Federal Rules and function of the federal courts). 
 220.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  Specifically, one author noted concern that the plausibility 
standard would result in greater use of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and cause 
meritorious claims to fail to reach discovery.  Joe S. Cecil, et. al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to 
State a Claim After Iqbal, Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee  on Civil Rules, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1 (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. 
 221.  See Cecil, supra note 220, at 1. 
 222.  There was a 2.2% increase in filings of 12(b)(6) motions from 2005–2006 to 2009–2010.  
Id. at 8. 
 223.  Id. at 10. 
 224.  See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189, at 170.  Compare Miller, supra note 18, at 
103 n.396 (writing in 2010, that “[a]lthough affirmative defenses could be the subject of a Rule(f) 
motion to strike, plaintiffs rarely challenge them at the pleading stage.  That could change, 
however”), with St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189, at 171 (writing, in 2013, that “federal 
courts have seen a surge in litigation involving the second category—pleading defects—given the 
uncertainty about whether the plausibility test applies to affirmative defenses”).  
 225.  Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith, Trial Practice: A Judicial Response To The Iqbal Revolution, 
94  MICH. B.J. 56, 56 (Sept. 2015).  
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court will have devoted its own limited resources addressing the motion.”226  
Judge Goldsmith adopted his own practice to deal with motions to dismiss 
based on Twombly and Iqbal.227  Even before a response is filed, he issues a 
preemptive order “giving the plaintiff leave to amend the challenged 
pleading within a specifi[ed] period.”228  While Judge Goldsmith’s practice 
may help to conserve the time and resources of his court, it highlights the 
inefficient procedural game-playing that occurs with increased motions 
practice.  
Similarly, this inefficient procedural game-playing will continue with 
the likely increase in motions to strike. Any increase in the burden of 
asserting an affirmative defense causes “cost and delay consequences” that 
must factor into any realization of efficiency with the plausibility 
standard.229  In Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell,230 the plaintiff filed two 
motions to strike the defendants’ nineteen affirmative defenses.231  The 
court stated that going through the process of striking the defenses and 
giving the defendant leave to amend the answer to more completely state 
the basis of each defense, “will only delay the inevitable litigation of the 
merits.”232  The application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses is 
inefficient, both from a case management perspective and for the resources 
expended to deal with the “retaliatory” motion to strike. 
b.  The Prejudice Required to Prevail on a Motion to Strike Is 
Not Met by Failure to Plead to the Plausibility Standard 
The motion to strike is also generally disfavored, with “a relatively 
strict standard” and “liberal” leave to amend, suggesting its purpose as a 
“fencing exercise,” rather than as a tool of effective case management.233  In 
the Fourth Circuit, Rule 12(f)234 motions are viewed with disfavor “because 
striking a portion of the pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often 
sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.”235  To prevail on a motion 
to strike an affirmative defense, “plaintiffs must demonstrate that they will 
                                                          
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  See Miller, supra note 18, at 102–03. 
 230.  Civil No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933 (D. Md. July 17, 2013). 
 231. Answer to Complaint at 12–13, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
0617 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 232.  Simple Cell, 2013 WL 3776933 at *9. 
 233.  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Assocs., No. 11-1809, 2012 WL 
2945489, at *5 (D. Md. July 17, 2012). 
 234.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).  Federal Rule 12(f) states that a “court may strike from a pleading 
any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”  Id. 
 235. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,  FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1380, 
647 (2d ed. 1990)).  
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be prejudiced if the defense is not stricken.”236  Although the Court has 
“wide” discretion to strike an affirmative defense “in order ‘to minimize 
delay, prejudice, and confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and 
trial,’” “when affirmative defenses are stricken, the defendant should 
normally be granted leave to amend.”237 
When reviewing a motion to strike, courts seem to place emphasis on a 
showing of prejudice by the plaintiff, rather than the appropriate pleading 
standard for affirmative defenses.238  In Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co.,239 the court concluded Twombly and Iqbal applied to 
affirmative defenses and stated that a “defense may be excised if it does not 
meet the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 9.”240  However, the Haley 
court still denied the motion to strike because the plaintiff did not articulate 
any prejudice that would occur from the denial of their motion.241  In 
Miller, the court refrained from even considering if Twombly and Iqbal 
applied to affirmative defenses and denied the motion to strike because the 
plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice.242  Similarly, in Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Associates,243 the court 
stated that “[e]ven if the [Twombly/Iqbal] pleading standards do apply, [the 
plaintiff] has not demonstrated prejudice in the event that this court denies 
their motion to strike.”244  Given this focus on whether prejudice will occur 
to the plaintiff, there is less emphasis on whether the defendant met the 
applicable pleading standard for affirmative defenses.  The use of the 
pleading standard as the basis of a motion to strike an affirmative defense 
seems to be more of “dilatory tactic” than an effective procedural tool.245 
B.  District Courts’ Extension of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative 
Defenses Violates the Rules Enabling Act 
The Rules Enabling Act246 empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe 
rules of practice and procedure in the federal courts.247  The Act “delegated 
                                                          
 236.  Miller v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., Civil No. TDC-14-2697, 2015 WL 235553, at *3 
(D. Md. Jan. 15, 2015). 
 237.  Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. at 336 (quoting Hayne v. 
Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009)). 
 238.  See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text.  
 239.  279 F.R.D. 331 (D. Md. 2012). 
 240.  Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. 331, 336 (D. Md. 2012). 
 241.  Id. at 337. 
 242.  Miller, 2015 WL 235553, at *3. 
 243.  No. CCB-11-1809, 2012 WL 2945489 (D. Md. July 17, 2012). 
 244.  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Assocs., Ltd., No. CCB-11-1809, 
2012 WL 2945489, at *5 (D. Md. July 17, 2012). 
 245.  Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001); see supra 
note 233 and accompanying text. 
 246.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77. 
 247.  Id. at § 2072(a). 
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the essential rulemaking function” to the Supreme Court.248  Additionally, 
the provisions of the Act created a detailed process to make or amend a rule 
of practice.249  The decision by district courts to extend the “heightened” 
plausibility standard beyond the arena of complaints as established by the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly250 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal251 
violates the Act.  Additionally, the Supreme Court is a more appropriate 
venue for deciding this question and providing a uniform standard for all 
federal courts. 
The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal established the heightened 
plausibility standard for pleading complaints.252  The Court interpreted the 
language of Rule 8(a)(2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief” to require some factual basis within the 
pleading.253  However, Rule 8(b)(1)(A) only requires a party to “state in 
short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.”254  By 
extending this “heightened” pleading standard to defenses, specifically 
under Rule 8(c) for affirmative defenses, district courts have essentially 
rewritten the rule to include the “showing” language stated in Rule 
8(a)(2).255  The extension of the heightened plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses interprets Rule 8(c) in a manner not deliberated by the 
Supreme Court in either Twombly or Iqbal and thus violates the Rules 
Enabling Act.256 
“The pervasive and substantial impact of the rules on the practice of 
law in the federal courts demands exacting and meticulous care in drafting 
rule changes.”257  The Rules Enabling Act contains provisions to create 
various committees to oversee the rulemaking process and ensure thorough 
                                                          
 248.  Laws and Procedures Governing the Work of the Rules Committees, supra note 6.  
 249.  Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, USCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-
works/overview-bench-bar-and-public (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).  
 250.  550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 251.  556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
 252.  See supra text accompanying notes 65, 90. 
 253.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).  See supra text accompanying note 66.  
 254.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A).  
 255.  See Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1218-JCC, 2011 WL 
98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding the Twombly Court interpreted the language of Rule 
8(a)(2) and therefore the Lopez court would not import that language to a “different rule that lacks 
that language”); see also Hansen v. Rhode Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 
F.R.D. 119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (determining the “drafters used different language in the sub-
sections” of Rule 8 and the court was therefore “hesitant” to extend the Twombly and Iqbal 
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) to Rule 8(c)). 
 256.  EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“The judiciary is 
commissioned to interpret the Rules as they are written, not to re-draft them when it may be 
convenient.”).  
 257.  Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, supra note 249. 
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review of any proposed amendments.258  The Judicial Conference 
“continuously stud[ies] the operation and effect of the general rules of 
practice and procedure in the federal courts.”259  The Advisory Committee, 
meanwhile, evaluates proposals for amendments to rules and proposes 
drafts of amendments.260  The decision regarding the scope of Twombly and 
Iqbal in the realm of pleadings is better left to these committees to analyze 
the effects on pleading in federal courts and propose suggestions to the 
Supreme Court.261  As discussed, supra, two theories regarding the role, and 
access to, courts animate the dialogue regarding pleading standards.262  As 
Arthur Miller, a prior member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, noted: “[u]ltimately, the 
Advisory Committee will have to reconcile the continuing viability of the 
values of 1938 with the realities of 2010, and find a way to uphold the 
principle of access and the other policy objectives underlying the original 
Rules while adjusting to contemporary litigation conditions.”263  Due to the 
significance of this decision, endorsing a particular theory regarding the 
role of courts and influencing subsequent judicial policies, the Supreme 
Court should provide resolution to the question of whether the plausibility 
standard extends to affirmative defenses or not. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether the “heightened” plausibility standard applies 
to affirmative defenses currently divides the lower federal courts.  The 
inconsistent application of the standard to affirmative defenses results in a 
state of uncertainty regarding the pleading standard, and exemplifies an 
unforeseen consequence stemming from the adoption of this standard by the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly264 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.265 
In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts 
should refrain from extending this standard to affirmative defenses in order 
to maintain a reliable standard, while also upholding fairness and efficiency 
                                                          
 258.  Laws and Procedures Governing the Work of the Rules Committees, supra note 6. 
 259.  Governance and the Judicial Conference, USCOURTS.GOV,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last visited Jan. 8, 
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 261.  Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that 
questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most 
effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”).  
 262.  See supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
 263.  See Miller, supra note 18, at 104. 
 264.  550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 265.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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in the litigation process.  Leaving this question to the discretion of each 
individual district court results in a fluctuating standard, which constitutes a 
significant drawback for defendants when pleading affirmative defenses.266  
The ensuing back and forth to determine the appropriate standard and deal 
with any “retaliatory” motions to strike only serves to increase cost and 
time delays for defendants and courts.267  The  extension of the 
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses also discounts the 
time constraints facing defendants and places a substantial burden to 
articulate the factual basis for any affirmative defense without adequate 
discovery.268  The continuing application of the standard by the district 
court violates the Rules Enabling Act, permitting courts to essentially 
rewrite the pleading standard for affirmative defenses to include a plausible 
factual basis.269  Resolution to this question is best left to the Supreme 
Court, to speak with one voice and provide a uniform standard for 
affirmative defense pleadings among all of the federal courts. 
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